NCJ Number
54366
Journal
American Economic Review Volume: 65 Issue: 3 Dated: (JUNE 1975) Pages: 314-325
Date Published
1975
Length
12 pages
Annotation
ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON PROPERTY CRIMES (PRODUCTION OFFENSES) AND RELATED PENALTIES IN THIS ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE USING INCOME-GENERATING AND TIME-CONSUMING MODELS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
Abstract
ECONOMISTS WHO HAVE APPLIED CHOICE THEORY TO THE STUDY OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION STRESS THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE DECISION TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE AND THE TRADITIONAL HOUSEHOLD CHOICE PROBLEM. THE COMMISSION OF MOST OFFENSES RESULTS IN AN EXPENDITURE OF EFFORT, THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASE IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S WEALTH POSITION, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A PENALTY. THE INDIVIDUAL'S LABOR-OFFENSE SUPPLY PROBLEM IS MODELED; WITH CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO THE PENALTY FOR AN OFFENSE, SPECIFIED AS A FINE, THE EMPHASIS IS ON THE ROLE OF COSTS IN AN OFFENSE DECISION. ECONOMIC AGENTS AND POLICY CHANGES AFFECT CRIMINAL CHOICE IN TERMS OF PAYOFF, WEALTH, ENFORCEMENT, AND PENALTY EFFECTS. THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY SURROUNDING PUNISHMENT SEEMS TO HAVE NO QUALITATIVE SUPPLY RAMIFICATIONS UNDER TRADITIONAL PREFERENCE RESTRICTIONS. THE INCOME-GENERATING MODEL AND THE TIME-CONSUMING MODEL OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ARE DESCRIBED, AND SUPPORTING EQUATIONS ARE GIVEN. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODELS FOR CRIMINAL CHOICE AND DETERRENCE SUGGEST THAT FIVE FACTORS MUST BE CONSIDERED: WEALTH, THE PAYOFF TO ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, ENFORCEMENT, PUNISHMENT, AND THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY SURROUNDING PUNISHMENT. SIMPLIFICATIONS IN A 'WEALTH ONLY' MODEL ARE THE RESULT OF A FAILURE TO FULLY SPECIFY THE TRANSFORMATION BETWEEN THE UNDERLYING MULTIATTRIBUTE MODEL AND ITS SINGLE ATTRIBUTE EQUIVALENT. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS DO NOT FOLLOW FROM THEORY BUT RATHER REQUIRE EMPIRICAL DETERMINATION OF RELATIVE MAGNITUDES. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL INFORMATION IS APPENDED. REFERENCES ARE CITED. (DEP)