NCJ Number
165871
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 86 Issue: 4 Dated: (Summer 1996) Pages: 1461-1491
Date Published
1996
Length
31 pages
Annotation
This note critiques the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995), in which the Court granted certiorari to determine whether police misconduct resulted in an innocent man's conviction and death sentence.
Abstract
Kyles claimed that, contrary to the findings of lower courts, the prosecution withheld evidence "material" to his defense in contradiction to United States v. Brady and United States v. Bagley. The Supreme Court found that the Fifth Circuit mistakenly applied the "Brady" "materiality" standard and that there was a "reasonable probability" that the evidence withheld from Kyles would have undermined the jury's verdict. Thus, the Court granted a new trial to reconsider the defendant's conviction and death sentence. This note argues that the Court did not grant certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's application of the "materiality" standard as it claimed, but rather to consider whether the lower court had sentenced an innocent man to death. By using an illusory "legal error" to justify certiorari rather than the Court's true concerns over imposition of the death penalty, the Court has confused the "materiality" standard for future courts. This note further argues that Justice Scalia and the dissent incorrectly asserted that the Court was barred from granting certiorari by the "two court rule" and 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Moreover, by arguing that the "two court rule" and 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 apply to "materiality" determinations, the dissent exacerbated a circuit court split over the proper standard of review. 303 footnotes