NCJ Number
130554
Date Published
1991
Length
191 pages
Annotation
This historical analysis examines how the U.S. Supreme Court has divided the fruits of litigation among the rich and poor in cases involving business regulation, welfare benefits, indigent criminal defendants, racial discrimination, and other economic issues.
Abstract
The first major section examines the Court's role in economic controversy and the U.S. Constitution as an economic document. The remainder of the sections consist of the division of the Court's history into conservative and liberal eras: the first conservative era (1790-1835), the first liberal era (1836-1890), the second conservative era (1890-1937), the second liberal era (1937-1969), and the third conservative era (1969-1990). One major conclusion drawn from the study is that the U.S. Supreme Court is and always has been a political body that often decides cases on the basis of socioeconomic values rather than value-neutral legal rules. During the first conservative era (1790-1835), the Court functioned, albeit often in a restrained fashion, as a protector of the wealthy; in the first liberal era (1836-1890), the Court assumed a role much like that of a neutral mediator between the rich and the poor; during the second conservative era (1890-1937), the Court assumed a role close to that ascribed to it by its more aggressive left-wing critics, namely, handmaiden to the corporate rich; during the period after 1937, the Court generally returned to the role of mediator between conflicting interests. The book advises that the current Court clearly favors the rich, and the best strategy for advocates of the poor is to stay out of the U.S. Supreme Court if possible and focus economic reform efforts in the Federal and State legislatures. Subject index