U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

NCJRS Virtual Library

The Virtual Library houses over 235,000 criminal justice resources, including all known OJP works.
Click here to search the NCJRS Virtual Library

Involuntary Civil Commitment - The Discerning Eye of the Law

NCJ Number
80129
Journal
State Court Journal Volume: 5 Issue: 4 Dated: (Fall 1981) Pages: 4-7,24-30
Author(s)
J Zimmerman; W L Fitch
Date Published
1981
Length
10 pages
Annotation
Problematical aspects of commitment law and procedures are discussed in regard to involuntary civil commitment to mental institutions. The article focuses on decisionmaking in view of vague State statutes and disagreement in critical areas on the rights and needs of the mentally ill.
Abstract
Statutory definitions of mental illness vary from State to State and, because of their general vagueness, are difficult to apply. Involuntary commitment is ostensibly for the person's own welfare. The legal justification for a parens patriae commitment depends upon proof that a person needs help. This need for treatment, unfortunately, cannot be measured objectively. Thus, most States are changing their statutory language to use 'danger to self' or 'gravely disabled' as the justification for a parens patriae commitment proceeding. Application of this criteria is also subjective, however. Other parens patriae statutes would focus on incompetency. This kind of statute is problematic in that it provides for commitment of mentally ill persons who cannot make their own treatment decisions. Persons who have been diagnosed as mentally ill, however, are not likely to be judged competent to make treatment decisions, and thus this kind of statute could result in commitment of even those persons who would escape commitment under the 'gravely disabled' or 'danger to self' statutes. Commitment because of dangerousness to society is a justifiable reason to commit. Problems occur in that there is no standard agreement on what constitutes dangerousness, and furthermore, the literature shows that predictions of dangerousness are not reliable. An additional problem is the stipulation in most States that a person be committed only if a less restrictive treatment option is unavailable. This raises concerns about the ability of the person to refuse the alternate treatment, the option left to the court if the less restrictive facility offers poor or inappropriate treatment or is full to capacity, and the court's ability to assemble information on all possible alternative treatments. Judges will have to become informed in the area of mental health and about the suitability of types of treatment to mental illnesses. In addition, courts will need to assemble information about specific local treatment programs. A total of 88 footnotes are included.