NCJ Number
175155
Journal
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Volume: 21 Issue: 4 Dated: October- December 1998 Pages: 321-330
Date Published
1998
Length
10 pages
Annotation
This article analyzes the "inner logic" of the "fatwa" issued by Usamah Bin-Laden and a coalition of four other Islamic movements on February 22, 1998.
Abstract
The themes and issues presented by Bin-Laden in the "fatwa" show a sophisticated mixture of religious legitimation for "jihad" (through selective retrieval of sacred passages from the Koran and the use of Muslim history) coupled with an astute political analysis of accumulated Muslim grievances both within a Saudi Arabian context and the wider Middle Eastern context. These issues have gathered strength, pace, and visible expression, both violent and nonviolent, in the post-Desert Storm period, whose most visible symptoms were the 1995 Riyadh and 1996 Dharan terrorist incidents. Like most other Islamic ideologues or spiritual leaders of Islamic movements, Bin-Laden veils and justifies the need to mobilize the Islamic community into action on the grounds of "self-defense" against aggression by forces hostile to Islam and Muslim peoples. Ironically, Bin-Laden views himself as a "peacemaker" whose vision restores Islam to its former glory as part of a violent struggle ultimately aimed toward achieving peace. In an effort to mobilize the masses to support this "self-defensive" struggle, Bin-Laden taps into the collective Muslim psyche by exploiting massacres of Muslims in Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnia, and even Qana (Lebanon), linking these to historical battles between Muslims and their enemies by then remolding them into a contemporary context. 16 notes and appended text of the World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders