NCJ Number
37533
Journal
Valparaiso University Law Review Volume: 10 Issue: 2 Dated: (WINTER 1976) Pages: 223-230
Date Published
1976
Length
8 pages
Annotation
REVIEW OF TWO SUPREME COURT RULINGS WHICH HELD THAT THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE DOES NOT NECESSITATE UNANIMITY AND THAT GUILTY VERDICTS SUPPORTED BY NINE OR TEN OF TWELVE JURORS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE.
Abstract
THE DECISIONS IN APODACA V OREGON (1972) AND JOHNSON V LOUISIANA (1972) WERE PARTIALLY BASED ON A LINE OF ITS OWN DECISIONS BEGINNING WITH THE RULING IN UNITED STATES V PEREZ (1824) WHICH HELD THAT IN FEDERAL CASES WHERE DELIBERATIONS RESULTED IN HUNG JURIES, THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN WAS NOT ACQUITTAL BUT A NEW TRIAL FOR THE DEFENDANT. THIS ARTICLE QUESTIONS THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON PEREZ IN JOHNSON BY EXAMINING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PEREZ AND THE ROLE OF THE DECISION IN BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SOCIETY AND THE ACCUSED BY ESTABLISHING THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF UNANIMITY AND REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARDS FOR EITHER CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT COURT RELIANCE ON PEREZ IN THE APODACA AND JOHNSON SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY VERDICT DECISIONS WAS INAPPROPRIATE.