NCJ Number
80202
Date Published
Unknown
Length
0 pages
Annotation
Designed for police officers and others requiring basic legal knowledge in handling hearsay information and in dealing with the probable cause setting in making an arrest, this discussion focuses on the legal ramifications of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Aguilar v. Texas (1964) and Spinelli v. United States (1969).
Abstract
Three cases preceding Aguilar and Spinelli are examined to provide historical perspective. These are Nathanson v. United States (1933), Jordanello v. United States (1958), and Cecil Jones v. United States (1960). All these cases were concerned with what goes into the judge's decisional process in issuing a warrant, either for a search or for an arrest. In the Cecil Jones case, the Court ruled that hearsay evidence is allowed to establish probable cause in issuing a warrant since such evidence is already allowed in the courtroom. However, the hearsay is acceptable only if a substantial basis exists for crediting the hearsay. In the Aguilar case, the Court ruled that the trustworthiness of hearsay information must be established on two prongs: (1) the basis of knowledge and (2) the veracity of the informant. This criteria is used for all sources, including primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. The Spinelli case explicated what was earlier said in Aguilar. Spinelli provided two therapeutic techniques to support the two elements of basis of knowledge and veracity for cases in which information may not be structurally strong on one or both of these prongs. If the veracity of the informant is weak, the Court said that independent police verification is needed to establish probable cause. If the basis of knowledge prong is weak, self-verifying detail (rich and vivid detail) can be used to bolster this element. Thus, these two devices supplement Aguilar.