NCJ Number
146822
Journal
Duke Law Journal Volume: 43 Issue: 1 Dated: (October 1993) Pages: 87-112
Date Published
1993
Length
26 pages
Annotation
This note examines constraints imposed on the application of capital punishment.
Abstract
In recent years, many States have statutorily created a "guilty but mentally ill" category to the list of possible verdicts in criminal cases. In State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19 (S.C.), cert. denied, 13 S.Ct. 137 (1992), the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld a capital sentence for an individual found to be guilty of murder but mentally ill under an irresistible impulse analysis. The author of this Note argues that this sentence ignored the basic principle permeating Eighth Amendment analysis of capital punishment; that there should be a direct correlation between the personal culpability of an individual and the punishment received. This Note examines the effect of volitional impairment on culpability in the context of two other death penalty cases, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) and provides an analysis of the "guilty but mentally ill" determination. The author concludes that the recognition of an inability to control one's actions should result in a proscription against application of the death penalty. Individuals who are convicted as guilty but mentally ill, therefore, should be ineligible for the death penalty. 127 footnotes