NCJ Number
85029
Date Published
1981
Length
83 pages
Annotation
This study assesses three components of the deterrence doctrine -- certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment -- simultaneously in a laboratory setting. It distinguishes between specific and general deterrence in that those subjects under specific deterrence were actually punished for deviating from game rules, while those under general deterrence were merely threatened with the same punishment.
Abstract
Subjects (male college students) played a computer-simulated version of the game 'Chicken' with the computer as their opponent. Subjects could receive advance information regarding the computer's selection by using the 'preview' button. This information enabled them to increase the number of points they won. The highest scorer of each of the 16 treatment combinations was promised a monetary reward. Subjects caught using the preview button, however, were told that they would be penalized points. A traditional linear analysis of variance and a logarithmic transformation of the subjects' scores were used to determine if a power-function model would better fit the data than a more traditional linear model. Findings show that the certainty of punishment was the single most important factor in deterring use of the preview button. Severity of punishment was significant under specific deterrence but not under general deterrence, and the celerity of punishment was unimportant. No significant treatment effect distinguished between specific and general deterrence; it did not appear to matter whether subjects were actually punished or merely threatened with punishment. The logarithmic models did consistently, but only marginally, better than the linear models. Data tables and over 70 references are provided. Appendixes include game instruments, the data sheet used, and the postexperimental questionnaire. (Author abstract modified)