NCJ Number
149398
Journal
Advocate Volume: 16 Issue: 2 Dated: (April 1994) Pages: 10-13
Date Published
1994
Length
4 pages
Annotation
This article examines two cases decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court that pertain to the limitations on so-called expert testimony in child sex abuse cases.
Abstract
In Hall v. Commonwealth (1993), the prosecutor examined a psychologist intern on the subjects of whether, in the intern's professional opinion, the child had been abused, and whether, in her opinion, the child was telling the truth. The court held that a psychologist is not qualified to express an opinion about whether a person has been sexually abused, and no expert witness of any type may vouch for the truthfulness of a witness's out-of-court statements. This invades the province of the jury under the ultimate fact rule. In Alexander v. Commonwealth (1993), there were three forms of misuse of expert witnesses. First, an inexperienced police detective stated that after hearing what the child said, she obtained an arrest warrant because, in her opinion, the child was telling the truth. Second, a social worker was called, and she read the child's out-of- court statements from CHR records made when the worker had interviewed the child. According to the Supreme Court, the trial court had misapplied a previous court ruling in admitting these statements under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The court held that this evidence was inadmissible as a business record because the child had no business duty to report anything to the social worker; therefore, the statements lacked the truthworthiness necessary to justify admission. Third, the prosecutor asked the physician who examined the alleged child victim whether a small hymen tear was consistent with what the defendant was alleged to have done. According to the Supreme Court, this amounted to an opinion about whether the defendant was guilty of rape. The error was deemed highly prejudicial.