NCJ Number
137229
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 82 Issue: 4 Dated: (Winter 1992) Pages: 1054-1108
Date Published
1992
Length
55 pages
Annotation
The legal and economic theories of criminal law enforcement are reviewed and compared to recent trends in the criminal enforcement of environmental regulations in order to assess the extent to which prosecutorial and sentencing practice are consistent with economic theories of criminal law.
Abstract
Several legal and economic theories are used to explain the need for criminal enforcement of environmental laws and the imposition of criminal sanctions. Economic theories are based on the optimal penalty model; one variation is the optimal penalty with "moral hazard." A detailed analysis of current practices in prosecuting and sentencing environmental crimes discusses the distribution of offenses and offenders, criminal sanctions for convicted organizations and individual co-defendants, and noncriminal sanctions for corporate crimes. Environmental crimes are included in most of the organizational guideline provisions put forth by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, although at this point, sentencing courts still have full discretion in setting monetary fines. The author suggests that, in drafting corporate sentencing guidelines, criminal sanctions should be based on harm and the probability of detection and should be considered along with civil sanctions, private settlements, cleanup costs, remedial actions, and loss of reputation. 173 notes