NCJ Number
131192
Date Published
1990
Length
405 pages
Annotation
This study uses economic theory to compare institutions and incentives that influence public and private performance in the provision of law and its enforcement.
Abstract
Economic analysis is used because the law enterprise requires the allocation of scarce resources. The analysis considers such topics as the characteristics of primitive legal systems and the evolution of common law and other legal systems. It explores modern law enforcement; the behavior of public police, prosecutors, and judges; and political corruption. Also addressed are current trends in government "contracting" with private firms for police and prison services as well as trends in private-sector provision of arbitration, mediation, and crime prevention. Issues in legal theory are discussed including the role of custom in law and the issue of how "law" should be defined. The book demonstrates that our modern reliance on government to make law and establish order is not the historical norm, since public police forces were not imposed on the populace until the middle of the 19th century in the United States and Great Britain and then only with considerable citizen resistance. The book argues that citizens today are not satisfied with complete reliance upon public means of protection, dispute resolution, and the maintenance of public order. Consequently, many citizens rely upon private means to increase their protection and resolve conflicts. The author's support for the privatization of social control is such that he argues "government production of internal order is unnecessary, and there is justification for as much privatization as can be developed." Chapter notes and a subject index