Economic Analysis of the Prosecutor

• NCJ Number: 80744
• Author(s): P J Koenig
• Date Published: 1981
• Length: 101 pages
• Grant Number(s): 78-NI-AS-0041
• Sponsoring Agency: US Dept of Justice
• Publication Format: Dissertation/Thesis
• Publication Type: Thesis/Dissertation
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Ohio State University - doctoral dissertation

Annotation

This paper presents an economic model of the prosecutor which assumes that the prosecutor minimizes the social loss from crime, subject to the constraints of the budget, the Constitution, and criminal procedure.

Abstract

The economic model developed differs from prior economic models of the prosecutor in two ways. First, it examines how the prosecutor affects and is affected by court delay with reference to crime deterrence. Second, it examines how defendants detained pending trial are treated differently by the prosecutor from those released pending trial. The model indicates that the weaker the evidence against a defendant, the greater the prosecutor's efforts to delay case disposition. For defendants detained pending trial, this practice is contrary to concepts of fairness and due process. The model also reveals that among defendants detained pending trial, the younger they are and the greater their financial resources, the greater the prosecutor's effort to convict them. Further, the model suggests that prosecutors 'price discriminate' (vary the severity of punishment according to a defendant's personal characteristics) more among released than detained defendants. The model also indicates that the prosecutor treats defendants pleading guilty more harshly than those demanding trials, contrary to popular perception. Finally, the model suggests that significant declines in a prosecutor's reelection chances tend to promote the prosecutor's discrimination against poor defendants. These implications of the model are examined in relation to some proposed judicial reforms, such as speedy trial legislation, liberalization of pretrial release standards, expansion of defendant rights, and improving pretrial detention facilities. The model also suggests a new empirical approach for examining the courts. Empirical evidence from the Baltimore courts is shown to support the model. Appended are a discussion of the prosecutor's categorization of defendants, estimation of defendant's probability of conviction in a trial, and a mathematical appendix. About 70 references are listed. (Author summary modified)