DOES REPORTING DETER BURGLARS? - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RISK AND RETURN IN CRIME - TECHNICAL REPORT

• NCJ Number: 59663
• Author(s): I GOLDBERG; F C NOLD
• Date Published: 1978
• Length: 34 pages
• Grant Number(s): 77-NI-99-0071
• Sponsoring Agency: US Dept of Justice; US Dept of Justice NIJ Pub
• Corporate Author: Hoover Institution
• Sale Source: National Institute of Justice/
• Publication Type: Report (Study/Research)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

EQUATIONS ARE CONSTRUCTED FROM EMPIRICAL DATA TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE PERCEIVED VICTIM-SPECIFIC PROBABILITY OF REPORTING HAS A DETERRENT EFFECT ON BURGLARS.

Abstract

IT IS HYPOTHESIZED THAT BECAUSE REPORTING INCREASES THE CHANCES OF APPREHENSION AND CONVICTION, IT SHOULD HAVE A DETERRENT EFFECT ON POTENTIAL OFFENDERS. BURGLARY OF RESIDENCES WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THE STUDY. THE PERCEIVED (BY THE POTENTIAL BURGLAR) REPORTING PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN HOUSEHOLD IS A VICTIM-SPECIFIC DETERRENT VARIABLE. THE MODEL OF TIME-ALLOCATION BETWEEN LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED IN THE LITERATURE (BECKER, 1968 AND EHRLICH, 1973) IS APPLIED TO THE CHOICE BETWEEN BURGLARY AND ALTERNATIVE ACTIVITIES. THE EMPIRICAL WORK OF THE PRESENT STUDY HAS THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF ESTIMATING A VICTIMIZATION EQUATION DESIGNED TO TEST THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TIME-ALLOCATION MODEL. THE MAIN DATA SOURCE IS THE NATIONAL CRIME PANEL VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS. THESE INCLUDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE VICTIMIZATION EXPERIENCE OF 300,000 HOUSEHOLDS, 14 PERCENT OF WHICH WERE BURGLARIZED IN THE YEAR PRECEDING THE SURVEY INTERVIEW. IN THE VICTIMIZATION EQUATION DEVELOPED, THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS A DICHOTOMOUS VICTIMIZATION-INDICATOR (WHETHER THE HOUSEHOLD HAS A BURGLARY VICTIMIZATION). THE HOUSEHOLD-SPECIFIC EXPLANATORY VARIABLES ARE THE PREDICTED VALUES FROM THE LOSS REGRESSION (VALUE OF PROPERTY LOSS) AND THE REPORTING REGRESSION (IMPUTED PROBABILITY OF REPORTING LOSS). THE PROBABILITY OF APPREHENSION IS APPROXIMATED BY A CITYWIDE VARIABLE. RESULTS SHOW THAT HOUSEHOLDS MORE LIKELY TO REPORT CRIMES ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE VICTIMIZED. IN ADDITION TO VICTIM-SPECIFIC DETERRENCE, AN AGGREGATE DETERRENT EFFECT IS FOUND, WHICH HAS PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS. IF A SIMILAR EFFECT EXISTS FOR OTHER CRIMES, A HIGHER REPORTING RATE REDUCES THE VICTIMIZATION RATE, BECAUSE OFFENDERS SHIFT FROM CRIME TO LEGAL ACTIVITIES. TABULAR DATA AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. THE APPENDIXES CONTAIN A TABLE OF DEFINITIONS AND DATA FOR THE ESTIMATED LOSS MODEL. (RCB)