Determining Outcomes of Negotiations - An Empirical Assessment (From Negotiating in Organizations, P 114-134, 1983, Max H Bazerman and Roy J Lewicki, ed. - See NCJ-94060)

• NCJ Number: 94063
• Author(s): L Greenhalgh; S A Neslin
• Date Published: 1983
• Length: 21 pages
• Sale Source: Sage Publications, Inc
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This paper reviews a methodological paradigm for examining the determinants of bargaining outcomes; the most significant aspects of this paradigm are the use of rich-context role-playing simulation; conjoint measurement of negotiator preferences; and principles of experimental design.

Abstract

This research is innovative in three respects. First, it develops highly realistic simulations of organizational situations and then uses measurement techniques that avoid the need to oversimplify complex situations to make them amenable to analysis. Second, it does not assume that simulation participants react the same way to the simulated situation but rather measures their reactions individually. Third, it does not assume that participants are homogeneous on salient dimensions such as bargaining skill, but rather measures these traits directly and incorporates them in the experimental design. The research organizes the principal determinants of the outcomes of negotiations under the following headings: negotiators' preference structures, situational power, and individual differences in negotiators' aptitudes and skills. The results presented indicate that the proposed research format can be fruitful in measuring the determinants of negotiated outcomes; e.g., the study established the ability of Nash's theory of cooperative games to predict the outcomes of negotiations. Important linkages were also found between individual difference measures and bargaining outcomes. Research remaining to be done is indicated. Tables, figures, and 26 references are provided.