NCJ Number
141387
Journal
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Volume: 15 Issue: 1 Dated: (Winter 1992) Pages: 275-284
Date Published
1992
Length
10 pages
Annotation
A newly configured Supreme Court has overruled recent precedents and held that the Eighth Amendment erects no "per se" bar to the admission of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.
Abstract
The Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee reasoned that the States are free to determine that the harm imposed on a victim's family is relevant to the moral blameworthiness of a defendant. Dissenters argued that because victim impact evidence encourages reliance on factors other than the culpability of the defendant, such evidence always prejudices the defendant. However, victim impact evidence is not inherently prejudicial and, consequently, its admission in capital sentencing proceedings does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Payne, found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree, was sentenced to death on each of the murder counts and to 30 years in prison for assault. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court which had found that the grandmother's testimony, although "technically irrelevant" under Booth, did not create a risk of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The Court recognized in Payne that the determination of who has the better argument on policy with regard to victim impact evidence rightfully belongs to the state legislatures. This renewed deference to State legislatures on capital sentencing issues most likely will extend the use of victim impact evidence to capital sentencing proceedings. 65 footnotes