NCJ Number
194601
Journal
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Volume: 71 Issue: 4 Dated: April 2002 Pages: 6-13
Date Published
April 2002
Length
8 pages
Annotation
This article reports on various aspects of 78 incidents in which Minnesota police officers used "deadly force" in the course of their official duties during the 20-year period of 1981-2000.
Abstract
For the purposes of this study, "deadly force" was defined as "the force that an actor uses with the purpose of causing, or that the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial risk of causing, death or great bodily harm." In the 78 incidents examined, officers used deadly force that resulted in the deaths of 80 citizens. The author personally interviewed many of the officers involved in those incidents to obtain their rank, experience, caliber of firearm, and firearm training requirements, along with the type of weapon used by the officers and the impact of the investigation following the incidents. The study also reviewed investigative files and photographs, together with media reports. Information was obtained on the feelings and needs of the officers; the conditions, such as time of day or officers' assignment, that increased the possibility of the need to use deadly force; better methods for preparing officers for such an event; and the relationship between the assignment, experience, training, age, and sex of the officers involved in the incidents. The study found that officers in large metropolitan departments were involved in approximately 75 percent of the shootings. Over two-thirds of the shootings occurred outdoors, and most shootings occurred between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m.; the majority happened on a Wednesday. Having more than one officer present at the scene apparently did not deter offenders from threatening the officers. The type of weapon displayed by officers also did not affect offenders' actions. Officers with a shoulder weapon did not have a greater deterrent effect than those with a handgun. Officers overwhelmingly felt prepared tactically for the shooting, believing that their training with a firearm was adequate for guiding their response in the incident; however, the psychological trauma that followed the shooting was unexpected and debilitating. Most officers indicated they were unprepared for the experiences that followed the shooting. Recommendations include having an agency other than the department of the involved officer conduct the investigation of the incident, preferably the unit of another department that routinely investigates homicides; including more low-light and artificial-light scenarios in firearms training; having all officers involved in a shooting death receive a mandatory consultation with a professional counselor; and increasing training in the use of nonlethal weapons in certain types of situations. 1 table and 9 notes