NCJ Number
104951
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 77 Issue: 2 Dated: (Summer 1986) Pages: 308-357
Date Published
1986
Length
50 pages
Annotation
This article examines the relationship between the constitutional limits on criminal presumptions and the meaning of due process over the 20th century and analyzes U.S. Supreme Court decisions since 1975 that had significant impact on the burden of proof and presumptions and inferences.
Abstract
Courts and legislatures have traditionally used burden of proof presumptions and inferences to reshape substantive law and alter the distribution of power between judge and jury. However, recent Supreme Court decisions have forbidden legislatures to enact statutory presumptions to satisfy or reallocate the burden of production or persuasion. The cases however have left intact legislative authority to determine what factors are relevant to criminal liability and which party shall bear the burden of proof on each factor. It is argued that the emphasis on how burden of proof and presumptions affect fact-finding and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases have influenced the changes in the law. However, these changes have little effect on the resolution of the vast majority of cases. Rather, their importance lies in their contribution to the prevailing meaning of due process and in providing assurance that the criminal justice system convicts only factually guilty people. While protecting the innocent has always been an important goal, it has become increasingly salient because of the increasingly harsh sanctions applied by the criminal justice system. 237 footnotes.