CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - INDEPENDENT RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION IN SIXTH AMENDMENT PERMITS DEFENDANT TO ACT AS OWN LAWYER AT STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS FARETTA V CALIFORNIA, 422 US 806 (1975)

• NCJ Number: 38704
• Journal: Cornell Law Review Volume: 61 Issue: 6 Dated: (AUGUST 1976) Pages: 1019-1044
• Author(s): A R LEVENTON
• Date Published: 1976
• Length: 26 pages
• Corporate Author: Cornell University
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Historical Overview
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

EXAMINATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN FARETTA V CALIFORNIA (1975) WICH AFFIRMED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DEFEND PRO SE AS A RIGHT IMPLICITY EXPRESSED IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.

Abstract

IN FARETTA, THE COURT RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL AND SELF-REPRESENTATION WERE SUBORDINATE TO THE RIGHT TO MAKE A FREE CHOICE FOLLOWING A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF COUNSEL. THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE US, THE OPINIONS IN FARETTA, AND PROCEDURAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION. THE QUESTION OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE RULING IS ALSO EXPLORED. THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT, DUE TO THE COURT'S FAILURE TO DEFINE THE LIMITS OF THE PRO SE RIGHT AND TO ARTICULATE PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR ITS EXERCISE, LOWER COURT DECISIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF FARETTA WILL HAVE TO BE RELIED ON UNTIL THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION AGAIN.