NCJ Number
192776
Date Published
August 1997
Length
129 pages
Annotation
This document provides information on a conference discussing biological terrorism.
Abstract
The discussion centered on whether biological terrorism posed a strategic threat to the United States and what approach is needed to minimize the chances it would take place. Study findings are emerging showing that, even though the number of terrorist incidents is declining, the amount of casualties per terrorist incident is actually increasing. Biological agents offer unique opportunities for terrorists because of their lethality, accessibility, and the fact that they can be covertly deployed. The United States is not currently prepared to counter weapons of mass destruction terrorism. Current U.S. plans to counter a strategic threat tend to be reactive. The United States has asymmetric advantage as well as asymmetric vulnerabilities. To counter this biological threat a change in strategic thinking in the way the U.S. approaches national security is needed. National defense is no longer a military-only problem. It now involves the civil, military, local, Federal, and national/international sectors. Deterrence is more problematical in the case of responding to and preventing weapons of mass destruction. Because of the covertness of the biological threat, the source may be unknown. The arms control paradigm is extremely problematic because of the inability to monitor biological weapons production, even with intrusive inspections and reporting requirements. Most of the material used to make biological weapons have legitimate civilian purposes. Panel discussions focus on the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction terrorism, the dynamics of terrorist groups, consequence management, and advanced countermeasures.