NCJ Number
178875
Journal
Boston College Law Review Volume: 40 Issue: 3 Dated: May 1999 Pages: 739-785
Date Published
May 1999
Length
47 pages
Annotation
Arguments against hate crime legislation are refuted on the grounds that they have ignored the important roles of the criminal law in condemning evil character and in accommodating the tensions between individualized and group justice.
Abstract
Critics of hate crimes legislation argue that hate crimes are no more morally reprehensible than similar crimes motivated by greed, power, lust, spite, or pure sadism and that hate-crime offenders cannot be held fully culpable for their prejudices. Second, critics argue that the harm to victims of hate crimes is no greater than the harm caused by other comparable crimes. They also contend that hate crimes are not the only crimes that can have repercussions beyond the immediate victim. Finally, they reject the claim that punishing hate crimes will reduce group conflict. However, the psychological and moral need for individualized justice is undermined when victims are harmed because they are targeted as members of a category rather than as unique beings. In addition, hate crimes contribute in an especially dangerous way to a racist culture that creates a subordinate status for marginalized groups and raises the risk of physical harms such as further assault. Finally, racist assaults rely on a despised theory of human worth that has been rejected by this country's modern constitutional culture. In contrast, hate crimes legislation promotes intergroup harmony by relying on political and emotional themes that should be common to all subcultures. This legislation also promotes a vision of virtuous citizen character that requires the condemnation of the racist personality. Footnotes