NCJ Number
54848
Journal
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Volume: 47 Issue: 6 Dated: (JUNE 1978) Pages: 4-10
Date Published
1978
Length
7 pages
Annotation
THE APPROPRIATENESS OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AS A MECHANISM FOR RESOLVING COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING IMPASSES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS OF POLICE OFFICERS AND FIREFIGHTERS IS CONSIDERED.
Abstract
COMPULSORY ARBITRATON OFFERS FOUR ADVANTAGES: (1) ITS BINDING AWARD CREATES A FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE; (2) IT PREVENTS STRIKES; (3) IT TENDS TO EQUALIZE THE POWER OF THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES; AND (4) IT PERMITS BOTH PARTIES TO SAVE FACE. THE MAIN FEATURE SETTING ARBITRATION APART FROM MEDIATION AND FACT FINDING IS THE BINDING AWARD. HOWEVER, THE BINDING NATURE OF ARBITRATION HAS RAISED SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE EXISTENCE OF A COMPULSORY ARBITRATION STATUTE REDUCES NEGOTIATING PARTIES' INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN HARD BARGAINING. FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION, WHICH REQUIRES THE ARBITER TO ACCEPT ONE OR THE OTHER PARTY'S FINAL OFFER, ADDRESSES THIS PROBLEM. ADVOCATES OF CONVENTIONAL AND FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION ARE DEBATING THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF TWO GOALS: AVOIDING THE POSSIBILITY OF INEQUITABLE AWARDS, AND INCREASING PARTIES' INCENTIVES TO REACH THEIR OWN AGREEMENT. SOME CRITICS OF ARBITRATION SUGGEST THAT IT PRODUCES MORE EXPENSIVE SETTLEMENTS THAN RESULT FROM DIRECT NEGOTIATION. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT ARBITRATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH FAVORABLE UNION OUTCOMES, BUT THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS EFFECT IS NOT LARGE. ANOTHER CRITICISM IS THAT COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, WITH ITS DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO A THIRD PARTY, IS CONSTITUTIONALLY AND POLITICALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. THE COURTS HAVE UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARBITRATION LAWS IN MOST STATES. HOWEVER, THE OTHER LINE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL INCOMPATIBILITY CRITICISM--THAT IT IS POLITICALLY UNWISE TO USE ARBITRATION AS A MECHANISM FOR ALLOCATING GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES--CONTAINS SOME POINTS WORTHY OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. (LKM)