NCJ Number
191699
Date Published
2001
Length
16 pages
Annotation
This paper looks at growing uncertainties of the terrorist threat, the specific Federal programs that are meant to deal with biological and chemical attacks, and the problems that exist for evaluating biological and chemical preparedness.
Abstract
Federal programs to prepare for biological and chemical terrorist attacks are directed under a plethora of policies and contingency plans. Responses are either crisis management, which tries to stop terrorists or make arrests, and consequence management, which tries to restore governmental services. The Federal Response Plan outlines the tasks of Federal agencies during responses to terrorist attacks. Before the September 11 attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) expected the threat to be in the form of a "lone wolf." But the events of Sept. 11 redefined weapons of mass destruction and indicated the terrorists were much better organized than the FBI ever imagined. Because of the uncertainty of the threat, GAO recommends that a risk management approach is necessary to increase domestic preparedness. Because not all threats can be protected against, it is better to concentrate on those that provide the highest level of concern. Federal agencies have special teams, laboratories and training programs to prepare against a terrorist attack. And they have current research and development projects to fight terrorism. The report identifies problems that need solutions so that preparedness efforts can be improved. Some of the problems are generally applicable to any type of terrorist event, while others are specific to biological and chemical events. For generic terrorist events, the report found there could be problems on clear responsibilities of agencies, conflicting operational procedures between Federal and local agencies, and a lack of resource management and communications capabilities. For biological and chemical attacks, the report saw problems when it came to public health surveillance, detection and risk assessment of the agents, a lack of specialized equipment, laboratories and vaccines, poor hospital decontamination procedures, poor distribution of pharmaceuticals, and poor quarantine planning.