NCJ Number
127490
Date Published
1987
Length
330 pages
Annotation
This book develops a theory of coercion based on an analysis of the way coercion claims have been legally adjudicated.
Abstract
At the most general level, there are two views about coercion. In one view, whether one is coerced is essentially an empirical question of an ordinary sort. In the other view, coercion claims involve moral judgments at their core. In arguing for a moralized theory of coercion, the author uses a comparative analysis of coercion in the law to support a philosophical perspective on coercion. The way in which coercion claims have figured in several legal contexts is analyzed, including contracts, torts, marriage, blackmail, confessions, plea bargaining, and duress as a criminal defense. The law provides a set of realistic examples of coercion claims, but courts have developed a general and important theory of coercion in adjudicating these cases. This theory holds that only immoral threats to which one is entitled to succumb can be said to coerce. The moral force of coercion claims is discussed as well as whether both offers and threats can coerce; differences between coercion, exploitation, no choice, and circumstantial pressure; and whether coercion compromises the voluntariness of one's actions. Footnotes, figures, and index