CLEARANCE RATE AS A MEASURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS.

• NCJ Number: 59444
• Journal: Journal of Public Economics Volume: 11 Dated: (1979) Pages: 135-142
• Author(s): P J COOK
• Date Published: 1979
• Length: 8 pages
• Corporate Author: North-Holland Publishing Co
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: Netherlands

Annotation

THE VALIDITY OF USING CLEARANCE RATES AS A MEASURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS OR PROBABILITY OF PUNISHMENT IS QUESTIONED.

Abstract

THE VALIDITY OF CLEARANCE RATES AS MEASURES OF SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS OR PROBABILITY OF PUNISHMENT FREQUENTLY IS QUESTIONED ON THE GROUNDS OF INACCURACIES IN THE DATA USED TO ESTIMATE THE RATES. BUT A MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS AND OBSERVED CLEARANCE RATES IS MEDIATED BY CRIMINALS' CHOICE OF BEHAVIOR. A CRIMINAL'S CRIME DECISION IS NOT ONLY QUANTITATIVE. IT ALSO ENTAILS CHOOSING THE PRECISE TYPE OF CRIME TO BE COMMITTED AND THE MANNER IN WHICH TO COMMIT THE CRIME. THESE CHOICES INFLUENCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CRIMINAL WILL BE ARRESTED AND PUNISHED. THE ARGUMENT THAT THESE CHOICES WILL BE SENSITIVE TO CHANGES IN SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS IS JUST AS STRONG AS THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT THAT THE RATE OF CRIME COMMISSION IS SENSITIVE TO SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS. OBSERVED CLEARANCE RATES ARE THE OUTCOME OF AN INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENT OF THREATS GENERATED BY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE ADAPTIVE CHOICES OF CRIMINALS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE SYSTEM BECAME MORE PROFICIENT AT APPREHENDING AND CONVICTING ROBBERS, POTENTIAL ROBBERS WOULD TEND TO BE MORE SELECTIVE IN CHOOSING VICTIMS AND MORE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR METHODS OF OPERATION. THE RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE OBSERVED CHANGE IN CLEARANCE RATES AFTER THE NEW PROFICIENCY WAS ACHIEVED WOULD BE MISLEADINGLY SMALL. IN FACT, AN EXTREME (BUT NOT IMPLAUSIBLE) CASE CAN BE DEVELOPED IN WHICH A CHANGE IN WHICH A CHANGE IN THE TRUE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM RESULTS IN NO CHANGE IN THE OBSERVED CLEARANCE RATE. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES OF DETERRENCE EFFECTS, WHICH HAVE FAILED TO TAKE THIS CHARACTERISTIC OF CLEARANCE RATES INTO ACCOUNT, ARE FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED. AN EQUATION THAT COULD BE USED TO CONSTRUCT AN INDEX OF SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS FREE OF THE INFLUENCE OF CRIMINALS' ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR IS SUGGESTED. A LIST OF REFERENCES IS INCLUDED. (LKM)