Civil Liberties and the Mass Line: Police and Administrative Punishment in the People's Republic of China (From Comparative Criminal Justice: Traditional and Nontraditional Systems of Law and Control, P 225-233, 1996, Charles B Fields and Richter H Moore, Jr, eds. -- See NCJ-161138)

• NCJ Number: 161151
• Author(s): D H Bracey
• Date Published: 1996
• Length: 9 pages
• Sale Source: Waveland Press, Inc.
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Description
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This paper explains China's policy of the "mass line" in police-community relations and its implications for China's use of administrative punishment.

Abstract

China's police training institutions teach that "the people's police are the servants of the people" and that the police must listen to the people and accept their supervision and criticism (Bracey, 1989). This is one way of expressing the principle of "following the mass line" and "relying on the masses," a policy that applies to police as it does to all public officials. Following the mass line requires that the police solicit and respect the opinions of the people, understand the conditions of their lives, and work closely with them. It requires the police to obtain and assess public opinion and translate it into policy. The concept of the mass line invites community participation in social control. Community organizations of citizens look for early signs of deviance among its youth and attempt to correct deviant behavior without police intervention. Should such efforts fail they may ask the police to intervene. Consistent with China's emphasis on early and efficient intervention in minor deviance, the Security Administration Punishment Act of 1986 (SAPA) identifies offenses that are to be handled administratively, that is, outside of the criminal courts. The act gives the police the power to impose warnings, fines of up to 200 yuan, or 15 days of detention. SAPA offenses lie somewhere between deviance and crime. Observers of this system are concerned that police may use SAPA as a way of circumventing the safeguards of the criminal procedure. With no defense attorneys to protect the rights of the accused and no judges to administer rules of evidence, and with a burden of proof lighter than that required for a criminal proceeding, both police and community might find it desirable to settle for a sure conviction and a lighter penalty rather than take a case to criminal court. The author notes parallels between China's system of administrative punishment and America's early juvenile justice system, which was subsequently found by the U.S. Supreme Court to abuse the procedural rights of juveniles brought before it. A 17- item bibliography