NCJ Number
169814
Date Published
1996
Length
30 pages
Annotation
This analysis of civil forfeiture considers the perspectives of both economics and legal history and concludes that the use of civil forfeiture as a form of sin tax has had the unintended and unfortunate consequences of reducing one of the few genuinely desirably sin taxes: the citizen protections contained in the Bill of Rights.
Abstract
Civil forfeiture may not appear threatening to those who are committed to eradicating illegal drug use, because it acts as a sin tax by raising drug dealers' costs while increasing the incentives of police agencies to find and destroy illegal drugs. However, civil forfeiture creates an inefficient bias in favor of prohibition. In addition, permitting law enforcement agents to retain proceeds from civil forfeiture promotes inefficient law enforcement decisions. Moreover, civil forfeiture raises constitutional issues in that it restricts the Bill of Rights, which acts as a tax on the propensity of government agents to violate citizens' liberties and confiscate their wealth. Although the analogy between ordinary sin taxes and Constitutional protections is not perfect, both policy considerations and constitutional law point to the need to abandon civil forfeiture completely. Figures, reference notes, and list of other reports from the same organization