NCJ Number
191180
Date Published
2001
Length
68 pages
Annotation
This document addresses the funding status of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, progress communities near the stockpiles have made toward being prepared in case of an accident, and what changes could take place so that full preparedness could be achieved.
Abstract
The Army plans to destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile (30,000 tons) by 2007. In 1988, the U.S. Army established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program to assist the 10 States with communities near the 8 storage facilities to obtain the additional necessary equipment and training they need to be fully prepared to protect the public, the facilities' workforces, and the environment in the unlikely event of a chemical stockpile accident. The program has received more than $761 million in funding since its inception. But distribution of funds to the States has not been equal. The Army expected the States to have completed the procurement of critical items by 1998, but this has not happened. Too little funding remains to procure all the critical items the States have identified as needed to be fully prepared in case of an emergency. Three of the 10 States (Maryland, Utah, and Washington) are fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency and 4 others (Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon) are making progress and are close to being fully prepared. This is a considerable improvement since 1997, when no State was fully prepared. Three States (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) are still considerably behind in their efforts. Some State and local emergency management officials have said that, unless all critical items are in place, they will not support the start of the Army's destruction of chemical agents. In 1997, officials signed a memorandum of understanding defining their specific roles and responsibilities in the program. The memo addressed some of the management problems that were caused by unclear roles and responsibilities and the lack of coordination. However, a number of problems have contributed to slowness in executing the program. Specifically, the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency were not providing Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky and their local communities enough technical assistance and guidance to resolve outstanding issues. GAO recommends the Secretary of the Army take a more proactive approach to improve working relations with the program States and communities. Actions should provide technical assistance and guidance, provide all states and their communities with training and assistance in preparing budget and life-cycle cost estimates and guidance plans, and establish specific measures of compliance with the benchmarks to more evenly assess performance and to correctly identify requirements. 6 appendices, tables, figures