Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs

• NCJ Number: 189475
• Author(s): Kwai-Cheung Chan
• Date Published: 1999
• Length: 19 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: US Government Accountability Office
• Corporate Author: US Government Accountability Office
• Sale Source: US Government Accountability Office; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Publication Format: Document
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Downloaded July 13, 2001

Annotation

The General Accounting Office (GAO) examined the coordination of Federal research and development efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to defense of chemical and biological weapons attacks.

Abstract

Since the Persian Gulf War, Congress has been concerned that the U.S. military is not adequately prepared to detect, identify and prepare troops against chemical and biological (CB) weapons. The president's fiscal year 2000 budget asked for $1.4 billion for programs aimed at terrorist threats from CB weapons; less than $1 billion is for programs to counter CB threats. The GAO report identifies Federal programs that conduct nonmedical CB defense-related research and development (R&D) and describes the existing mechanisms for coordinating these programs. The four programs that fund R&D of nonmedical CB defense technologies are: Department of Defense's Chemical and Biological Defense Program; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare Defense Program; Department of Energy's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program; and Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by the Technical Support Working Group. All the programs pursue R&D ranging from applied research to prototype development. Two of the programs (CB Defense Program and Biological Warfare Defense Program) develop technologies primarily for military warfighting applications. The other two develop CB defense technologies primarily to assist civilians responding to terrorist incidents. The current program coordination mechanisms may not ensure that potential overlaps are addressed. Coordinating mechanisms lack information on prioritized user needs, validated CB defense equipment requirements, and how programs relate R&D projects to those needs. Domestic preparedness needs are specified with significantly less detail than military needs. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Department of Energy's program do not formally take advantage of user requirements in planning their R&D goals. More detailed information about how user needs related to R&D projects and CB defense equipment requirements may allow coordination mechanisms to better assess whether overlaps for collaboration exist. Officials are aware of the deficiencies and some have started informal contacts in response. The GAO makes no recommendations at this time. Figures, appendix