NCJ Number
96957
Date Published
1985
Length
81 pages
Annotation
An econometric model is presented and estimated which examines the impact of relatively high crime rates on urban property values and the resulting effects on the public sector which finances crime control.
Abstract
Building on the theoretical model developed by Hellman and Naroff, the model includes the interrelationships among incentives for criminal activity, crime control efforts by the public sector, and the constraints imposed on the allocation process by criminal activity. The revised model incorporates five interactions in the system: the impact of crime on property values and the tax base, the impact of both crime and local fiscal constraints on law enforcement expenditures, the impact of law enforcement expenditures on law enforcement productivity, the impact of law enforcement activity and other variables on crime, and the impact of intergovernmental transfers on local budgets and law enforcement expenditures. Data from 88 cities were used in developing estimates. The codebook for the dataset, footnotes, figures, and a list of 56 references are included.