NCJ Number
88231
Journal
Loyola University Law Journal Volume: 13 Issue: 4 Dated: (Summer 1982) Pages: 817-840
Date Published
1982
Length
24 pages
Annotation
An analysis of the development of distinctions among crimes of murder focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Enmund v. Florida and concludes that capital punishment is appropriate only in those murders in which evidence exists of the most serious moral culpability directly related to the homicide.
Abstract
While homicides were punishable by death from the earliest documentation of English law, notions of specific intent did not apply to the crime of murder until the introduction of degrees of murder in the United States. While willful murder has been constantly narrowed in its application, felony murder has been expanded to a doctrine of vicarious liability for crimes not contemplated at common law. With increasing frequency, the Supreme Court is having to review the imposition of the death penalty in view of the defendant's participation in a homicide. In Enmund v. Florida, Enmund received the death penalty even though he was only known to have been in a car when an elderly couple were murdered at their nearby home. On July 2, 1982, the Supreme Court reversed Enmund's death sentence as violative of the 8th and 14th amendments. The Enmund decision represents a clear rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murder cases. However, the decision's rationale represents a leap toward an abridgement between willful murder and felony murder in capital cases. At a minimum, the death penalty should not be imposed unless evidence exists that the offender purposefully killed the victim. Although this will place an additional burden of proof on the prosecution, this complication has not caused the Supreme Court to hesitate when dealing with questions of the mitigations of murder to manslaughter. Footnotes are included. (Author summary modified)