NCJ Number
59264
Journal
Criminal Law Bulletin Volume: 15 Issue: 4 Dated: (JULY/AUGUST 1979) Pages: 346-352
Date Published
1979
Length
7 pages
Annotation
THE DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CONCERNING THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION IN CRIMINAL CASES ARE EXAMINED.
Abstract
THE PROSECUTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING TO THE JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE DEFENDANT. IN RE WINSHIP (1970) THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PROTECTS THE ACCUSED AGAINST CONVICTION EXCEPT HIS GUILT IS PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. IN THE SUBSEQUENT CASE OF MULLANEY V. WILBUR (1975), THE HIGH COURT DECIDED THAT MAINE LAW WHICH REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE ACTED IN THE 'HEAT OF PASSION ON SUDDEN PROVOCATION' TO REDUCE MURDER TO MANSLAUGHTER IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS. THE PROSECUTION IS REQUIRED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE ABSENCE OF 'HEAT OF PASSION' WHEN IT IS PROPERLY PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE IN A MURDER CASE. IN PATTERSON V. NEW YORK (1977) A NEW YORK LAW WAS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL WHICH REQUIRED A DEFENDANT TO ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE ACTED 'UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE' TO REDUCE THE MURDER CHARGE TO MANSLAUGHTER. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE IMPERMISSIBLE MAINE LAW INCLUDE THE PROSECUTION'S BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH MALICE AFORETHOUGHT, ALTHOUGH THE PERMISSABLE NEW YORK LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF MALICE. UNDER WINSHIP, THIS ELEMENT MUST BE PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND MAINE'S HANDLING OF THE PROOF OF MALICE BY PRESUMPTION CAUSED MAINE'S LAW TO FAIL. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MAINE AND NEW YORK PRACTICES IS THAT THE PROSECUTION IN NEW YORK CAN NOT HAVE ANY ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF MURDER CONCLUSIVELY IMPLIED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH EVIDENCE. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK).