NCJ Number
189704
Journal
Emerging Infectious Diseases Volume: 4 Issue: 3 Dated: July-September 1998 Pages: 1-7
Date Published
1998
Length
7 pages
Annotation
The paper, using real examples of variola major (smallpox) and Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) outbreaks in other countries, ponders what potent biological weapons would be used in the United States.
Abstract
Nations and dissident groups have the motivation and skills to cultivate some of the most dangerous pathogens and to deploy them. The Japanese cult, Aum Shinkrikyo, released sarin in a Tokyo subway in 1995. Four countries engaged in biological weapon experimentation in 1960's, but that number has grown to 11 in the 1990's. Biological terrorism is more likely than ever before, but preventing it will be extremely difficult. In 1962, a boy traveling from Brazil through New York to Toronto developed variola major (smallpox) symptoms, starting a debate about whether the U.S.-Canadian border should be closed. A German electrician returning from Pakistan created a small outbreak of smallpox in 1970. Another outbreak occurred in Yugoslavia in 1972 when physicians failed to make a diagnosis. So if smallpox was released in the U.S., it would easily spread to other cities, drying up vaccine reserves. In Russia in 1979, 77 cases of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) were identified and 66 of those patients died. There would be many questions to answer if anthrax was diagnosed, such as should a vaccine be administered to those who might have been exposed or should antibiotics be administered to treat symptoms. The U.S. is not prepared to deal with a biological attack. The U.S. needs to be able to detect, diagnose, characterize epidemiologically and respond appropriately to biological weapons. References