NCJ Number
190868
Date Published
2001
Length
26 pages
Annotation
The document is a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the status of public health preparedness programs in response to bioterrorism attacks.
Abstract
Testimony of Janet Heinrich before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Health; Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, United States Senate. Testimony also given before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives. And given before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. More than 20 Federal departments and agencies have a role in preparing for or responding to the public health and medical consequences of a bioterrorist attack. Coordination between the groups is fragmented, but actions have been taken to improve this situation. The GAO found emerging concerns about the preparedness of State and local jurisdictions, including insufficient State and local planning for response to terrorist events. Bioterrorism attacks are low-probability events, but they have occurred. The burden of responding to attacks falls initially on local firefighters, police, and emergency service personnel. Some response features are unique, such as to those attacks whose symptoms may not surface for several days or when agents are contagious. Spending on domestic preparedness programs has risen 310 percent since fiscal year 1998 to about $1.7 billion in FY 2001. But only a portion of the funds were used to conduct a variety of activities related to research on and preparedness for the public health. Research is being conducted to enable the rapid identification of biological agents, develop vaccines, and test emergency response equipment. Appendix I provides reported research funding for all the departments. Preparedness efforts have included ways to increase response capabilities, develop medical professional response teams, and sponsor terrorism response exercises. Appendix II contains information on total reported funding for all departments with bioterrorism preparedness activities, along with examples of these activities. Interagency work groups are being used to minimize duplication of funding and effort in Federal activities to combat terrorism. Overall coordination of Federal research and development efforts to combat terrorism is still limited by several factors, including the compartmentalization or security classification of some research efforts. Table 1 shows Federal activities providing assistance to State and local governments for emergency bioterrorism planning. Fragmentation is also apparent in the composition of groups of Federal agencies involved in bioterrorism-related planning and policy. Nonprofit research organizations have concerns about insufficient State and local planning and a lack of hospital participation in training on emergency response planning. Local officials are concerned whether the Federal government could quickly deliver enough medical teams to help after a biological attack. Weaknesses exist in communication among responsible parties. Adequate laboratory and hospital capacity is a concern.