NCJ Number
202579
Date Published
December 2001
Length
15 pages
Annotation
This paper frames the issue of "bioterrorism" (the intentional release of biological agents and toxins to terrorize a civilian population or manipulate a government) in a historical context; reviews the policy and health implications of a bioterrorist attack; and describes some policy and preparedness initiatives nationally, in Texas, and in other States.
Abstract
The use of biological agents that are toxic to humans has been used in wars and battles since Neanderthals coated their arrowheads with animal excrement to make them more toxic. Despite numerous efforts to eliminate the use of biological weapons since the end of World War I, their development persists in various parts of the world. Although biological agents are dangerous and difficult to develop and manage as weaponry, advances in biotechnology and easy access to necessary equipment and materials to establish labs make them attractive weapons for terrorists. Because of the continuing difficulty of dispersing biological agents, however, experts still consider the effective, widespread use of germs by terrorists as an increasing, but still unlikely risk. The recent anthrax attacks in the United States, however, show the possibility for using a biological agent to inflict terror on a population through a targeted dissemination of a deadly biological agent. In March 2000, the U.S. Congress directed the U.S. Department of Justice to conduct a mock bioweapons attack and engage key top officials to manage the aftermath. The exercise involved responding to a covert release of aerosol plague bacilli at the Denver Performing Arts Center. Participants noted significant confusion about the roles of various authorities and decisionmaking processes, conflict among State and Federal agencies, exhaustion, communication problems, lack of coordination, and insufficient resources as major problems during the drill. Hospitals that participated in the drill were "beyond capacity in less than 24 hours of the epidemic." The core problem was the lack of an enforceable disease containment plan. A similar drill that involved a simulated smallpox attack was conducted in June 2001. Similar difficulties were revealed in this drill. This paper also notes the legal issues that would probably evolve from a bioterrorist attack, such as the liability of ill-prepared medical facilities and services and the liability of drug and vaccine manufacturers. A review of Federal preparedness initiatives focuses on efforts to upgrade capacity, the establishment of the Health Alert Network, and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program. One section of this paper addresses Texas' state of preparedness for a biological attack. There have been efforts on a number of fronts to upgrade interagency and intergovernmental communication systems, medical preparedness, and interagency training. The most significant problem identified for Texas is the State's current lack of resources to handle a major attack. Almost every public service that would be instrumental in countering a biological attack is already severely strained, i.e., hospitals, medical personnel, laboratories, and emergency services. Policymakers and community leaders must focus on finding more resources to handle a bioterrorist attack and exercise the leadership to allocate those resources wisely. 127 notes