NCJ Number
212330
Date Published
2005
Length
13 pages
Annotation
After placing the bioterrorism threat in historical context, this chapter describes the components of current bioterrorism defense, followed by a discussion of some of the key differences between biological weapons and other weapons as well as the continuing challenges that these differences pose for policymakers in crafting a bioterrorism defense.
Abstract
The use of biological agents and toxins as weapons has a long history, and nations have sporadically used biological weapons during war. Although the biological Weapons Convention of 1972 forbids the development, use, or stockpiling of biological weapons, signatory nations have widely violated its provisions. In recent years, the threat of biological weapons in the hands of non-nation terrorists has become increasingly clear, but the risk of a widespread bioterrorism attack is difficult to estimate, since a range of factors will affect the impact of any specific attack. The threat in itself, however, has spurred U.S. policymakers to design and implement an effective and comprehensive bioterrorism defense. The broad policy goals are to deter and punish the creation, acquisition, or use of biological weapons; to limit the proliferation of weapons and the materials and information needed to create them; to protect likely bioterrorism targets; and to prepare for responding to an attack. These measure have both domestic and international scope. A critical issue in preparation for responding to a comprehensive bioterrorist attack is determining the amount of resources allocated to prepare for treating numerous victims compared to the level of risk for an attack, given the multitude of public health threats that may pose a higher risk. 89 notes and discussion questions