NCJ Number
192092
Date Published
2002
Length
12 pages
Annotation
This chapter discusses the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention of 1972.
Abstract
Among other provisions, the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention (BTWC) of 1972: (1) prohibited the development or acquisition of BW agents and delivery devices, except for use in peaceful activities; (2) mandated that existing BW arsenals had to be destroyed or diverted to peaceful uses; (3) prohibited member nations from helping other states or organizations develop a BW capacity; (4) outlined the procedure if one member state wishes to accuse another of a BTWC violation; and (5) protected more peaceful uses of BW technology, emphasizing the benefits of both the biological agents and the associated technology for the public health sector and the biotechnical industry. Unfortunately, the Convention lacks a cohesive plan for guaranteeing compliance and building international confidence. The chapter discusses in some detail the success of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the comparative ineffectiveness of the BTWC. In July 2001, when the United States rejected the latest version of a proposed BTWC protocol, some other states decided it was not worth pursuing negotiations further. The chapter concludes that, while the U.S. rebuff of the recent verification and compliance scheme does not mean America has withdrawn from the treaty, it casts a shadow on the viability of a future diplomatic consensus on the BTWC and its implementation. Figure, notes