NCJ Number
61282
Journal
Duke Law Journal Volume: 4 Dated: (1978) Pages: 1041-1068
Date Published
1978
Length
28 pages
Annotation
FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURTS IN EVALUATING PREARREST DELAY CLAIMS ARE ANALYZED, AND THE RECOMMENDATION MADE FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS UNDER THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND THE PRIVILEGE OF EQUITY.
Abstract
PREARREST DELAY OCCURS WHEN THERE IS A TIME LAPSE BETWEEN COMPLETION OF THE PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATION OF A CASE AND NOTIFICATION TO THE DEFENDANTS OF THE CHARGES TO BE BROUGHT AGAINST THEM. IN ROSS V. UNITED STATES (1965), THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REVERSED A CRIMINAL CONVICTION BECAUSE OF A 7-MONTH LAPSE BETWEEN THE OFFENSE OF THE DEFENDANT AND HIS ARREST. THE COURT FOUND 'PURPOSEFUL DELAY' BY THE POLICE, SINCE THE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE CRIME INVOLVED DUPLICATION OF PREVIOUS INQUIRIES. THE COURT ALSO FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD ASSERTED A 'PLAUSIBLE CLAIM OF INABILITY TO RECALL OR RECONSTRUCT THE EVENTS OF THE DAY OF THE OFFENSE,' AND POINTED OUT THAT THE PROSECUTION RELIED ON THE REFRESHED RECOLLECTION OF A SINGLE WITNESS. BECAUSE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON PREARREST DELAY FAILED TO ESTABLISH DEFINITIVE STANDARDS, ACCORDING TO WHICH DUE PROCESS CLAIMS SHOULD BE EVALUATED, THE LOWER COURTS WILL CONTINUE TO APPLY THEIR OWN STANDARDS IN THE SAME CONFLICTING MANNER USED SINCE 1966. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS USUALLY ANALYZED PREARREST DELAY CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT, JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DELAY, AND THE RISK OF ERRONEOUS CONVICTION. ALL COURTS WHICH HAVE REQUIRED THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW PREJUDICE AND DELIBERATE DELAY ALSO REQUIRE PROOF OF MALICIOUS INTENT ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION. A TWO-PRONGED ANALYSIS OF PREARREST DELAY CLAIMS CONSIDERS THE BASIS FOR SUCH CLAIMS UNDER FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)