NCJ Number
70599
Journal
Terrorism Volume: 1 Issue: 3 and 4 Dated: (1978) Pages: 347-362
Date Published
1978
Length
16 pages
Annotation
This paper focuses on developing the analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism, or the threatened use of terrorist acts to gain concessions from the victim; two game-theoretic models of terrorism are examined.
Abstract
Game theory is used to seek answers to the following questions: (1) when will people resort to extortionate terrorism? (2) when will extortionate terrorism succeed and when will it fail? (3) what constitutes an 'optimal' threat, i.e. what bribes, extortion, ransom, or payoff should be asked in exchange for which hostages or property? (4) when should unsuccessful threats be carried out and when should they be abandoned? and (5) how should a victim choose among potential responses to specific terrorist threats and to the general problem of terrorism? Two different game-theoretic models of terrorism are examined; one uses ordinal preferences, the other uses von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. It is concluded that actions which transform threat-vulnerable situations to threat-invulnerability or which make clear which situations are threat-invulnerable serve to reduce the incidence of attempted extortionate terrorism. Further, the success or failure of a threat depends not on logic but on psychologic. Finally, the terrorist and the victim, in formulating a response to each incident, are guided not only by present gains and losses, but by the effect their response has on others' perception of their credibility and resolve. Tabular data illustrating the theories and 15 references are included. (Author abstract modified)