NCJ Number
129377
Date Published
1991
Length
74 pages
Annotation
This chapter on the adjudication of guilt by plea addresses the entry of the guilty plea, the guilty plea's effect on later assertion of rights, and plea bargaining.
Abstract
In the plea process, the trial judge is generally directed by "admonition requirements" to inform the defendant of certain matters before the plea is accepted. The judge may be required to inquire about certain matters, such as the existence of a plea bargain and any promises that have been made to the defendant. The judge may also be required to make certain findings of fact relating to the voluntariness of the offered plea and similar matters before accepting it. A formal record of the plea proceedings may be required. The chapter presents the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), requiring that a trial judge not accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that the plea is intelligent and voluntary. The effects of a guilty plea on the defendant's later assertion of rights are addressed in the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Blackledge v. Perry (1974) and Menna v. New York (1975). Cases on "voluntariness" in plea bargaining and related matters cover basic voluntariness considerations (Brady v. United States and Bordenkircher v. Hayes); trial judge participation (Frank v. Blackburn); and pleading guilty without admitting guilt (North Carolina v. Alford). The role of the trial judge in accepting or rejecting the plea is considered in United States v. Ammidown, and the necessity of respecting a plea bargain once made is addressed in Santobello v. New York and United States v. Benchimol. Some efforts to abolish plea bargaining are also discussed. Case notes are included.