NCJ Number
141299
Journal
Vanderbilt Law Review Volume: 46 Issue: 1 Dated: (January 1993) Pages: 235- 265
Date Published
1993
Length
31 pages
Annotation
This paper examines the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in White v. Illinois (1992), in which the Court held that the confrontation clause does not require the prosecution to show that the declarant is unavailable prior to the introduction of hearsay statements under the spontaneous declaration and medical diagnosis exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Abstract
The "White" Court framed its confrontation clause analysis in terms of ensuring the admission of reliable and probative evidence. In so doing, the majority limited its prior safeguards for criminal defendants' confrontation rights. By restricting the necessity requirement of "Coy" and "Craig" to special in-court procedures, the Court found hearsay that was not subject to cross-examination was more consistent with the goals of the confrontation clause than in-court testimony under child-protective procedures. The limitation of "Roberts'" unavailability requirement to former testimony again reduced the confrontation clause protections available to criminal defendants by imposing fewer requirements on prosecutors seeking to introduce uncross-examined out-of-court statements than testimony that has been subject to some form of cross-examination. The "White" decision will have a significant impact on the confrontation rights of all criminal defendants. The Court did not limit its holding to child sexual abuse cases, but rather announced a broad ruling applicable to all criminal defendants. 251 footnotes