NCJ Number
76459
Date Published
1977
Length
32 pages
Annotation
The nature of terrorist attacks on security forces is considered, a conceptual approach to dealing with terrorist action is discussed, and an organizational model for official response to terrorist acts is described.
Abstract
Attacks on security forces are an initial and primary goal of terrorist groups. These groups attempt to portray security forces as unable to ensure the safety of society by suppressing violence and as responding to terrorist acts through the illegitimate or excessive use of force. Professional analysts of terrorism place terrorism in a definite position along a larger continuum of coercive manipulation. Three general types of coercive manipulation include extremism, terrorism, and urban guerrilla warfare. Terrorist groups are faced with an institutional dilemma, however, which offers security forces an opportunity to take an offense role against them rather than assuming the usual defensive stance. To achieve their goals of political change, terrorist groups must either cease their violent activities and work legally within the system as extremists or they must engage in open confrontation with security forces and defeat them, a difficult objective given the relative weakness of most groups. In order to defeat terrorists under these conditions, a security force going beyond the focused firepower, light infantry squad approach characterized by SWAT teams is needed. This force should have the capability to acquire and process situation intelligence, function as a single unit where large numbers of personnel are involved, operate a complex field communications system, and provide resources sufficient for an extended siege-type of operation. The unit should possess public relations capabilities and the force necessary to perform paramilitary assaults, and should be able to perform negotiations, operate as independent small units and overwhelm major terrorist concentrations when necessary. Operationally, the force should be divided into support and operations units. The operations section should consist of negotiating and assault units, with the assault unit possessing heavy weaponry capabilities. The support section should consist of logistics and information sections. Likely missions include kidnappings and hostage situations, assassinations, assaults and surrogate warfare, bombings, and special technical threats (such as seizure of nuclear facilities). The force should operate as openly as possible to avoid labeling as a secret police organization. A total of 20 footnotes, 18 references and 1 suggested reading are included; an organization chart is also provided.