Supply Security of Coal and Uranium (From Political Terrorism and Energy - The Threat and Response, P 65-83, 1982, Yonah Alexander and Charles K Ebinger, eds. - See NCJ-90259)

• NCJ Number: 90261
• Author(s): J Cobbe
• Date Published: 1982
• Length: 19 pages
• Sale Source: Praeger Publishers
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

The discussion examines the vulnerability of coal and uranium to terrorist attacks by identifying possible vulnerable points in the chains of supply of these minerals, both important energy sources for industrialized countries.

Abstract

Terrorists could disrupt coal production through sabotage or by indirectly working through the labor force. Terrorists could sabotage shafts of galleries, although this would be difficult and dangerous. Such sabotage seems unlikely, and its risk could be reduced by appropriate personnel procedures and safety standards. Given the nature of coal supply and use, and the strong probability that terrorist disruption would only be short-lived, serious economic or social dislocation from terrorism aimed at the coal supply seems unlikely. Similarly, it seems unlikely that terrorist attacks on uranium supply could produce serious economic dislocation. Given the nature of nuclear power generation, even successful attacks on uranium supply would only slowly work through into a reduction in electricity. More serious are the possible indirect effects of successful terrorist attacks on the uranium supply chain. Repercussions from attacks resulting in the release of radioactive materials or the misappropriation of enriched uranium would be great. Physical security, intelligence, certain personnel policies, and contingency planning are recommended precautionary measures. A total of 11 reference notes are included.