SELF-INCRIMINATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE MIRANDA V ARIZONA AND BEYOND

• NCJ Number: 66937
• Journal: Wake Forest Law Review Volume: 15 Issue: 2 Dated: (APRIL 1979) Pages: 171-206
• Author(s): L V SUNDERLAND
• Date Published: 1979
• Length: 36 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: National Endowment for the Humanities
• Corporate Author: Wake Forest University
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

HISTORICAL RATIONALES AND PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ARE DISCUSSED AS A BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF CASES INVOLVING SELF-INCRIMINATION.

Abstract

IN MIRANDA, THE COURT HELD THAT A PERSON IN CUSTODY MUST, PRIOR TO INTERROGATION, BE CLEARLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. THE MIRANDA DECISION IS NOT A WELL-REASONED OR WELL-SUPPORTED OPINION. THE COURT'S UNDERSTANDING OF COMPULSION AND THE CREATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ARE NOT FIRMLY SUPPORTED BY THE LITERAL MEANING OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE HISTORY AND RATIONALES OF THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED, THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF GOVERNMENT, OR BY SOUND INTERNAL PRECEDENT. THE ROOTS OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN ENGLISH LAW GREW OUT OF THE PRACTICES OF ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS. BY THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY, THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION EXISTED IN ALL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND EXCEPT IN THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. IN CONTRAST, AMERICAN HISTORICAL RECORDS REVEAL LITTLE OF THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. IN CONSTITUIONAL TERMS, THE RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE CONFESSION RULE SEEM LOGICALLY TO MERGE IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE OF THE ELEMENT OF COMPULSION IN EACH. NEVERTHELESS, LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDMENT FAILS TO JUSTIFY THE MIRANDA HOLDING AND ITS INCLUSION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WITHIN THE RIGHT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, A NUMBER OF SELF-INCRIMINATION CASES DECIDED BY THE BURGER COURT, SUCH AS OREGON V. HASS (1975) AND MICHIGAN V. TUCKER (1974) HAVE NOT BEEN EXTENDED TO INCLUDE SITUATIONS WHICH INVOLVE ARGUABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE MIRANDA-BASED RIGHT TO COUNSEL OR COROLLARY WARNINGS. INSTEAD, SUCH DECISIONS MAY REFLECT MERE POLICY PREFERENCES OF THE COURT. THE WARREN AND BURGER COURTS WOULD HAVE BETTER SERVED THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IF THEY HAD UTILIZED THE HISTORICAL RATIONALES OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT IN DRAFTING THEIR DECISIONS. FOOTNOTES ARE INCLUDED. (LWM)