NCJ Number
188737
Journal
Security Journal Volume: 13 Issue: 4 Dated: 2000 Pages: 35-52
Date Published
2000
Length
18 pages
Annotation
This paper examines the nature and extent of maritime piracy, reviews theoretical explanations of this emerging crime problem, and then explains the recent spate of piracy attacks by using a routine-activities approach.
Abstract
In order to examine trends in piracy attacks, this paper used the International Maritime Bureau's (IMB's) definition of piracy, because the IMB is the only organization that compiles data on maritime piracy. The IMB defines "piracy" as "an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of the act." Aside from the lack of data on attacks on private boats and yachts, the IMB began to collect data only as recently as 1990, when the threat of crime at sea had increased to a point where it could no longer be ignored. Data on piracy attacks by region for the period of 1991-97 showed a total increase from 107 attacks in 1991 to 229 attacks in 1997. Routine activities theory explains crime by the presence of three factors: motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of capable guardians. Cottrill's investigation of piracy shows that pirates are highly motivated, in that they attack from speedboats, armed with automatic weapons, mortar shells, and even antitank rockets. They are further aided by the Global Positioning System and sometimes board ships with computer printouts of the cargo the ship is carrying. When a vessel is carrying millions of dollars in commercial goods, with little or no security measures, the motivation of offenders is clear. Commercial ships are suitable targets because of their vulnerability; however, with the increasing awareness of contemporary maritime piracy, some ships are taking measures to reduce their vulnerability. Pirates are most active in waters where government presence is weak. Attacks have become especially frequent in Asian waters, where the absence of naval power, coastal police patrols, cooperative law enforcement, and treaty agreements have made the shipping lanes virtually free of capable, willing, and competent guardians. In such situations, ship owners must take steps to ensure that vessels avoid becoming suitable targets. Increased vigilance coupled with cosmetic changes (e.g., lighting) may mitigate the threat of future attacks. 4 tables and 92 notes