NCJ Number
112738
Journal
Columbia Law Review Volume: 88 Issue: 4 Dated: (May 1988) Pages: 774-801
Date Published
1988
Length
28 pages
Annotation
In his 1987 article, Gerard E. Lynch asserts that the broad scope of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) law was an historical accident and that Congress never anticipated the major uses for which RICO has been employed.
Abstract
Lynch proposes reforms that would curtail RICO in three crucial respects. He suggests that white-collar and political corruption offenses be removed as RICO predicate crimes and treated separately in the Federal penal code. He would limit RICO's enterprise element to require further specificity of size and structure, and he would repeal three RICO provisions, leaving only the prohibition against conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. If adopted, such reforms would restrict RICO to criminal enforcement efforts against illicit enterprises engaged in traditional mob-type activities. Here, it is argued that Lynch's premises concerning RICO and its scope are fundamentally flawed. RICO's original purposes, properly understood, have been satisfied in many respects. The law's objective is the eradication of organized crime. While this goal has yet to be achieved, it would not even be a possibility if Congress had not intended RICO to be applied against organized crime families and other illicit enterprises. Congress also intended RICO to be used against white-collar crime. Thus, the law's substantive and procedural tools are available both to officials prosecuting complex crime and those victimized by it. At the same time, RICO is not overkill: its apparent breadth has been tempered both by its structural requirements and cautious judicial interpretation. 191 footnotes.