NCJ Number
85517
Journal
American Journal of Criminal Law Volume: 9 Issue: 3 Dated: (November 1981) Pages: 281-386
Date Published
1981
Length
106 pages
Annotation
This article discusses the issues raised by various definitions of recklessness and explores the likely meaning given the term in the Model Penal Code.
Abstract
Mens rea, the mental element of a crime, is perhaps the most complex and significant factor in determining criminal responsibility. The four mental states or types of culpability upon which criminal responsibility is based include purpose, knowledge, negligence, and recklessness. Recklessness is the most complex, most utilized, and most critical of the four types of culpability because for many crimes it defines the minimum level of culpability, thus making the difference between acquittal and conviction. The Model Penal Code definition of recklessness is an important factor in evaluation of criminal responsibility. This definition, however, has been criticized as too abstract and academic and as being too complex for a jury to understand. It is suggested herein that the concept is no more complex than the tort concept of negligence. Other critics argue that the code's definition is not complex enough. It should be noted that the code definition of culpability may be used as a component of other kinds of culpability created ad hoc in the definitions of specific crimes. The Model Penal Code has brought to criminal law more uniformity, consistency, and clarity than ever before existed. However, the code was not intended to be uniform legislation. State modifications of the code's definition of recklessness have varied in effectiveness. Some variations have caused confusion, and some have improved the code. Nevertheless, the code definition remains of crucial importance. State code citation information is appended, and 347 footnotes are provided.