Reason, Anger, and Retribution (From Crime and Punishment: Issues in Criminal Justice, P 41-61, 1989, Fred E Baumann and Kenneth M Jensen, eds. -- See NCJ-122184)

• NCJ Number: 122187
• Author(s): J L Sedgwick
• Date Published: 1989
• Length: 21 pages
• Sale Source: University of Virginia Press
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This article compares the role of anger in the reasoning of two schools of retribution.

Abstract

Differences over the role of anger in retribution reflect different understandings of ethics and moral philosophy. Supporters of Kant reject the relevance of the anger of law-abiding citizens in criminal justice, for they emphasize a moral approach focusing on the intentional act of the will. Retributionists who follow Aristotelian ethics, on the other hand, focus on intentionality and the ethic of consequences. Kant's approach is discussed in detail and compared with Aristotle's views as expressed in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. Aristotle's conclusion that anger is necessary to sustain morality is discussed. Retributive theory grounded in Aristotle's view is judged to be more reflective of human life than is Kant's more formal abstract alternative. 22 footnotes.