NCJ Number
38673
Journal
Indiana Law Journal Volume: 51 Issue: 4 Dated: (SUMMER 1976) Pages: 987-1024
Date Published
1976
Length
38 pages
Annotation
A DESCRIPTIVE MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF PLEA BARGAINING IS DEVELOPED BASED ON THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT DEFENDANTS WANT TO MINIMIZE SENTENCES AND THEIR LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION WHILE PROSECUTORS NORMALLY WANT TO MAXIMIZE THEM.
Abstract
DECISION THEORY AND EQUILIBRIUM MODELING ARE USED TO CREATE MATRICES SHOWING HOW A DEFENDANT AND A PROSECUTOR IN A HYPOTHETICAL CASE EACH VIEWS THE MOST LIKELY SENTENCE IF (A) THE DEFENDANT PLEADS GUILTY BEFORE A JUDGE IN A NON-NEGOTIATED PLEA WHEN HIS PROBABILITY OF BEING CONVICTED (OR PC) IS RELATIVELY NEAR ZERO, (B) THE DEFENDANT PLEADS GUILTY BEFORE A JUDGE WHEN IN A NON-NEGOTIATED PLEA THE PROBABILITY OF HIS BEING CONVICTED IS RELATIVELY NEAR 1.0, (C) THE DEFENDANT GOES TO TRIAL WHEN HIS PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION IS ZERO, AND (D) THE DEFENDANT GOES TO TRIAL WHEN HIS PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION IS 1.0. THE CELL ENTRIES SHOW LIKELY SENTENCES IN TERMS OF YEARS FOR A CRIME THAT ALLOWS FOR AT LEAST AS MUCH AS 10 YEARS IN PRISON, WHICH WOULD MEAN A MAJOR FELONY CASE. A DISCUSSION OF OPTIMUM STRATEGIES OR BARGAINING LIMITS CONSIDERS THE ROLE OF BENEFITS AND COSTS OTHER THAN SENTENCE YEARS, SUCH AS THE SAVING OF TIME, MONEY, AND REPUTATION. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT)