NCJ Number
15473
Date Published
1974
Length
21 pages
Annotation
SEVERAL ISSUES RELATING TO STANDARDIZATION OF DIVERSION PROCEDURES, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, THE BASIS FOR DIVERSION PROGRAMS, AND SUGGESTIONS ON DIVERSION PROCEDURES ARE DISCUSSED.
Abstract
IT IS ARGUED THAT A TRADITIONAL 'NO CHARGE' DECISION BY A PROSECUTOR DOES NOT OPERATE TO DIVERT OFFENDERS OUT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, SINCE IT OFFERS NO PROGRAM TO AFFECT BEHAVIOR AND RECIDIVISM. SIMILARLY, POLICE DIVERSION PROGRAMS ARE VIEWED AS UNSATISFACTORY, SINCE THEY ARE OFTEN SUBJECTIVE AND UNSTANDARDIZED. THE AUTHOR STATES THAT PROSECUTORY DIVERSION IS NOT A USURPATION OF A LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL FUNCTION, BUT IS ANOTHER FORM OF THE PROSECUTOR'S TRADITIONAL DISCRETIONARY POWERS. GUIDELINES DEALING WITH STANDARDS ON ACCEPTING PLEAS OF DEFENDANTS, THE KINDS OF DEFENDANTS TO ACCEPT FOR DIVERSION, AND FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN DECIDING TO DIVERT ARE DISCUSSED. SUGGESTIONS ON UNIFORM APPLICATION OF DIVERSION PROGRAMS, POLICE-PROSECUTOR COOPERATION IN DIVERSION EFFORTS, AND WRITTEN REPORTS ON DIVERSION PROGRAMS ARE PROVIDED. LEGAL ISSUES SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO SUE A PROSECUTOR FOR EXERCISING HIS DISCRETIONARY POWERS ARE ALSO DISCUSSED.